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Reconsidering In tern a tiona! 
Tax Neutrality 
MICHAEL S. KNOLL* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Kennedy Administration, two principles have dominated 
U.S. international tax policy and the debate over what that policy 
should be: capital export neutrality (CEN) and capital import neutral-
ity (CIN).1 The central idea in the literature is that an income tax 
cannot simultaneously satisfy both CEN and CIN unless tax rates on 
capital are harmonized across countries? Over the intervening fifty or 
so years, the U.S. government's commitment to CEN or CIN has 
swung back and forth.3 One reason for those shifts in policy is the 
widespread view that both goals cannot be achieved simultaneously.4 
In an insightful and important new article, Fadi Shaheen challenges 
that view.s Shaheen does not argue that the traditional proof of the 
impossibility claim, discussed further below, is wrong. Instead, tracing 
the normative conceptions of CEN and CIN back to their origins in 
Peggy Musgrave's 1963 and 1969 books,6 Shaheen argues that CEN 
and CIN have been misconstrued.? Using CEN and CIN as defined 
by Musgrave,8 Shaheen argues that a territorial tax system can simul-
taneously satisfy both neutrality benchmarks without the need for 
* Theodore K. Warner Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Professor of 
Real Estate, Wharton School; Co-director, Center for Tax Law and Policy, University of 
Pennsylvania. I thank Fred Brown, Ruth Mason, Fadi Shaheen, and Reed Sbuldiner for 
their comments and suggestions, and Alvin Dong and Benjamin Meltzer for their 
assistance with the research. 
I For a brief history of U.S. international tax policy, see Reuven S. A vi-Yonah, All of a 
Piece Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S. International Taxation, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 313 
(2005). 
2 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Out-
dated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, NYU 
School of Law (Oct. 26, 2000), in 54 Tax L. Rev. 261, 272 (2001). 
3 Avi-Yonah, note 1, at 315-16. 
4 Id. at 325. 
5 Fadi Shaheen, International Tax Neutrality: Reconsiderations, 27 Va. Tax Rev. 203 
(2007). 
6 Peggy B. Richman, Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: An Economic Analysis 
(1963); Peggy B. Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income (1969). 
7 Shaheen, note 5, at 205. 
8 Id. at 207-13. 
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governments to harmonize tax rates. 9 Shaheen, further, argues that in 
the absence of harmonization a worldwide tax system will satisfy 
neither benchmark.1o 
There is much to admire in Shaheen's article, which illuminates a 
great deal of the contemporary discussion of international tax policy, 
provides insightful economic analysis, and advances the dialogue 
among economists, lawyers, and policymakers. I disagree, however, 
with Shaheen's ultimate conclusions, which I believe are exactly back-
ward. Interpreting CEN and CIN largely as Shaheen does, which I 
believe is also the way those concepts generally are understood by 
lawyers, and policy analysts, albeit not professional economists, I ar-
gue that only a worldwide tax system can satisfy both CEN and CIN 
simultaneously. In contrast, in the absence of harmonization, a terri-
torial tax system can achieve CIN but not CEN. 
In this Article, I also show that the traditional proof that an income 
tax capnot simultaneously achieve both CEN and CIN is valid if CIN 
is interpreted not as it was understood by Musgrave and is used today 
by lawyers and policy analysts, but instead as it came to be used by 
econo~ists beginning in the 1980's. There are, thus, two alternative 
and different interpretations of CIN, and the failure of commentators 
to be clear about which interpretation they have in mind when they 
use the term CIN has been the source of much confusion. I hope this 
Article will help to dispel some of that confusion. At the very least, 
writing this Article has helped me to understand more clearly the im-
portant international tax policy issues and academic debates of the 
day. 
II. THE Two PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL TAX 
NEUTRALITY PROPOSITIONS 
Both CEN and CIN are neutrality propositions. That is, they are 
statements about when tax considerations will not distort decisions. 
In general, when taxation distorts decisions, it imposes an otherwise 
avoidable welfare cost. Unfortunately, it is impossible (or nearly so) 
for a tax not to distort some decisions. The different capital neutrality 
benchmarks refer to different decisions that investors make. 
The normative goal behind CEN is that tax considerations should 
not influence whether investors resident in one jurisdiction invest 
their capital at home or abroad. If the tax system satisfies CEN, busi-
ness, not tax, considerations will determine where investors invest. 
9 Id. at 225-33. 
10 Id. at 219-25. 
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This is often said to be efficiency enhancing because it will produce a 
more efficient global allocation of capital.11 
The normative goal behind CIN is often expressed as tax considera-
tions should not influence whether a particular investment is made by 
domestic or foreign investors. If the tax system satisfies CIN, busi-
ness, not tax, considerations will determine who makes which invest-
ments. It sometimes is said to be efficiency enhancing for a tax system 
to satisfy CIN because it will reduce inefficiencies in the structure of 
cross-border holdings.12 
III. THE WIDELY AccEPTED PRoOF OF THE INCONSISTENCY OF 
CEN AND CIN 
For many years, one of the principal ideas in the literature on inter-
national tax policy was that it is impossible for a tax system to satisfy 
both CEN and CIN simultaneously without harmonizing tax rates on 
capital. The often-repeated proof of that claim, which is usually and 
most easily expressed through an example, is straightforward.13 As-
sume that the United States imposes a 40% income tax and that the 
European Union imposes a 30% income tax. In order to satisfy CEN, 
U.S. investors must pay the same 40% tax on income earned in the 
European Union that they pay on income earned in the United States. 
That requires the United States to tax its residents on their worldwide 
income and to provide a foreign tax credit (FTC) for the full amount 
of tax paid to the European Union. Such a tax system is called a 
worldwide tax system.l4 It also is sometimes called a residence-based 
tax system or a credit system.15 Under such a tax system, U.S.-based 
investors investing in the European Union will pay tax to the Euro-
pean Union on their income at a rate of 30%. They also will be taxed 
at a 40% rate in the United States on that income and receive a credit 
for the 30% tax paid to the European Union. Thus, they will have to 
pay 10% of their EU earnings to the United States in taxes, which 
leaves them with a total tax payment equal to 40% of their income. 
Hence, for U.S. taxpayers, CEN is satisfied if the United States has a 
worldwide tax system. 
11 E.g., Ruth Mason, Tax Expenditures and Global Labor Mobility, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1540, 1569-71 (2009). 
12 E.g., id. at 1571-72. The alternative interpretation of CIN that has dominated much of 
the discussion among economists is discussed below at Subsection IV.B.l. 
13 See, e.g., Graetz, note 2, at 272 n.36. 
14 E.g., Paul R . McDaniel, Territorial vs Worldwide International Tax Systems: Which Is 
Better for the U.S.?, 8 Fla. Tax Rev. 283, 289-90 (2007). 
15 E.g., Shaheen, note 5, at 205-06 (residence-based tax system); Graetz, note 2, at 328-
31 (credit system). 
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The analysis is similar with one difference for EU-based investors 
investing in the United States. The U.S. tax authorities will collect 
40% of the EU investors' U.S. earnings in taxes. Because the U.S. tax 
liability on that amount exceeds the EU tax liability by 10%, the EU 
does not collect additional tax. That, however, is not the end of the 
story. In order to satisfy CEN, the European Union must provide a 
tax rebate to its investors of 10% of their U.S. income. Without a 
rebate EU-based investors would not pay tax at the same rate on their 
income earned in the United States as on their income earned in the 
European Union (30% ). Such a provision often is referred to as an 
unlimited FTC because the credit is not limited to the residence coun-
try's tax on that income. Such a payment brings a high foreign tax 
rate down to the lower domestic tax rate, thereby achieving CEN for 
EU taxpayers.16 
The standard argument continues by turning to CIN. In terms of 
the example, CIN requires that U.S. investors pay tax at the same rate 
as EU investors in every market. Both EU and U.S. investors in the 
European Union pay tax at 30%. Because all investors in the Euro-
pean Union, whether EU residents or U.S. residents, pay 30% tax to 
the European Union, it follows that if the United States does not tax 
the Ep income of U.S.-based investors, then both groups of investors 
will pay tax at the same rate. Similarly, EU-based investors investing 
in the United States, pay tax to the United States at a rate of 40%, the 
same tax rate paid by U.S. investors investing in their home market. 
If the European Union neither taxes nor provides a rebate to its inves-
tors investing abroad, EU-based investors will pay the same tax in the 
United States as their U.S. competitors. Such a tax system, in which 
the home country does not tax its residents on the income they earn 
abroad, is called a territorial tax system.l'? It is also sometimes called a 
source-based tax system18 because income is taxed only at its source 
or an exemption tax system19 because foreign source income is ex-
empt from tax. Such a tax system will satisfy CIN. 
The inconsistency of the two goals-CEN and CIN-immediately 
follows. CEN requires that U.S.-based investors pay the same 40% 
16 Note that if the FfC is limited to the product of the domestic tax rate and foreign 
income, then the EU investor receives a FfC of only 30% of foreign income. Although 
that leaves the EU investor with no additional tax liability to the EU, because the investor 
has already paid tax equal to 40% of that income to the U.S. Treasury, the investor's total 
tax liability is 40%, not 30%. The last 10% tax paid to the United States generates no 
usable FfC. Thus, if the FfC is limited, then CEN will not be satisfied for the EU inves-
tor. In that case, the tax system sometimes is said to satisfy CEN with respect to the U.S. 
investor but not the EU investor. 
17 E.g., McDaniel, note 14, at 290-91. 
18 E.g., Shaheen, note 5, at 205-06. 
19 E.g., Graetz, note 2, at 328-31. 
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tax in the European Union as they pay when they invest in the United 
States, which requires a worldwide tax system with an unlimited FTC. 
CIN, however, requires that U.S.-based investors pay the same 30% 
tax in the European Union that EU-based residents pay there, which 
requires a territorial tax system.20 Thus, CEN and CIN cannot both 
be satisfied simultaneously unless the European Union and the 
United States both tax income at the same rate.21 
If the European Union and the United States both tax income at 
the same rate, say 40%, then the global tax system would simultane-
ously satisfy both CEN arid CIN.22 From the U.S. perspective, the 
U.S. investor would pay tax at 40% whether the investment took place 
in the European Union or the United States. Thus, CEN would be 
satisfied. The EU-based investor would also pay tax at 40% when the 
investment was made in the United States. Thus, CIN also would be 
satisfied from the U.S. perspective.23 
The above demonstration is quite standard and it can be found in 
one form or another in many articles and books, with many more cit-
ing the result.24 It is, however, wrong, or at the very least misleading. 
To understand my criticism of the claim that CEN and CIN cannot 
simultaneously be satisfied without harmonizing tax rates we need to 
look more closely at the concepts of CEN and CIN, which for nearly 
fifty years have dominated the debate about international tax policy. 
20 The analysis is similar from the EU perspective. CEN requires EU investors to pay 
tax at 30% when they invest in the United States, but CIN requires EU-based investors to 
pay tax at 40% when they invest in the United States. 
21 As others have pointed out, a cash-flow consumption tax will satisfy both CEN and 
CIN simultaneously without the need to harmonize statutory tax rates. E.g., David Brad-
ford, The X Tax in the World Economy (CESifo, Working Paper Series No. 1264, Princeton 
Law & Public Affairs, Paper No. 03-9, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=447780. 
That is because such a tax has the effect of exempting the ordinary return to capital from 
tax. Id. Thus, if two countries adopt cash-flow consumption taxes at different statutory 
rates, then they have both set their tax rates on capital to zero. In effect, a consumption 
tax only taxes the income from labor, which is the only income to which the statutory rate 
is applied. 
22 In such circumstances, it does not matter whether the tax systems of the European 
Union and the United States are both territorial, both worldwide, or one is territorial and 
the other is worldwide. Regardless of the host country's method of providing double tax 
relief, an investor in a foreign country does not pay any tax to the investor's residence 
jurisdiction on foreign-source income. 
23 The analysis is identical from the EU perspective. The EU investor's total tax pay-
ment would be equal to 40% of income whether the EU investor invests at home or 
abroad. Also, a U.S. investor who invests in the European Union would pay tax at 40%, 
the same as an investor from the European Union. 
24 One of the clearest and best known examples comes from Graetz, note 2, at 272 n.36. 
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IV. GIVING NORMATIVE CONTENT TO CEN AND CIN 
The economic analysis of international tax policy takes as its start-
ing point the ideas that the maximization of global welfare is an ap-
propriate goal of tax policy and that taxation by distorting economic 
decisions reduces that welfare.25 In a world where labor and land are 
(or at least were) viewed as immobile, but capital is viewed as highly 
mobile, international tax policy is concerned with the impact alterna-
tive tax policies can have on various capital market decisions. By in-
terfering with those decisions, tax policy imposes a welfare cost on 
society. The various tax neutrality propositions represent tax systems 
that do not distort specific capital decisions. 
Sometimes, tax neutrality is measured against a baseline of the ideal 
nontax world.26 Under certain restrictive assumptions, a world with-
out taxes is efficient in the sense that it maximizes aggregate welfare. 
Under those same assumptions, the imposition of a tax that changes 
behavior reduces welfare. In those circumstances, the distortion 
caused by the tax can be measured against the baseline of the untaxed 
world. In a market in which there are already distortions (that is, 
other taxes), however, the welfare consequences of imposing a new 
tax, r.emoving an old tax, or revising an existing tax cannot be mea-
sured against the nontax baseline. In order to determine whether any 
tax policy change produces a distortion, we look for margins across 
which changes to public and private benefits are not equal.27 
In such a world, a tax policy change increases a distortion when it 
increases the difference between public and private benefits.28 It 
reduces that same distortion when it reduces that difference. To as-
sess the total welfare consequences of any given change all of the dis-
tortions across all dimensions must be summed. That is a daunting 
task. It is also one that in theory can go in either direction. Thus, 
imposing a tax can reduce or increase welfare and eliminating a tax 
can increase or reduce welfare. Although either result is possible in 
theory, in practice nearby effects are likely to dominate distant effects. 
Accordingly, the practice is to look at the public and private benefits 
25 Most scholars advocate or assume that the international tax system should seek to 
maximize global welfare. For a dissenting view, see Graetz, note 2, at 277-82, who argues 
that each country should maximize national welfare. Shaviro argues that, because of the 
possibility of retaliation, the way for most countries to maximize national welfare is to seek 
to maximize global welfare. Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative 
Standard for U.S. Tax Policy?, 60 Tax L. Rev. 155 (2007). 
26 E.g., Shaheen, note 5, at 206-15. 
27 See, e.g., Chris W. Sanchirico, A Critical Look at the Economic Argument for Taxing 
Only Labor Income, 63 Tax L. Rev. 867, 871 (2010). 
28 The welfare consequences of a distortion generally increase roughly as the square of 
the magnitude of the distortion. Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy 582 
(2d ed. 2005). 
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at nearby margins. Viewed from such a perspective, a tax is inefficient 
with respect to any particular decision when the ratios of private and 
social benefits across that margin are not equal. If there are such mar-
gins, then a hypothetical central planner can increase welfare by mak-
ing changes across that margin. In that case, the tax system is said to 
be inefficient with respect to those dimensions. Conversely, the 
dimensions on which welfare cannot be improved by the hypothetical 
planner by shifting resources are said to be efficient.29 The welfare 
benchmarks of international tax policy focus on the various decisions 
that capital owners make. 
A. The Normative Meaning of CEN 
The welfare benchmark of CEN focuses on the location of capital. 
Viewed against the nontax baseline, a world in which CEN is satisfied 
is one in which the allocation of capital across jurisdictions is the same 
as it is in the untaxed world. That is to say, if the market would pro-
duce an equilibrium such that the allocation of assets across jurisdic-
tions is the same as that a planner trying to maximize global welfare 
would produce, then the tax system satisfies CEN. Expressed in terms 
of shifting assets to increase welfare, a tax system satisfies CEN if it is 
not possible to increase aggregate welfare by changing the location of 
assets. The contribution that any asset makes to global welfare is a 
function of the before-tax rate of return generated by the asset. Thus, 
if the before-tax rates of return on the marginal asset in each jurisdic-
tion are equal, then global welfare cannot be increased by shifting as-
sets across borders. In such circumstances, the tax system is said to 
satisfy CEN. 
As Musgrave pointed out many years ago, a worldwide tax system 
with an unlimited FTC will satisfy CEN.30 A worldwide tax system 
with an unlimited credit ensures that all investors pay tax at their 
home country tax rate on all income regardless of where it arises. Be-
cause investors are concerned with their after-tax return, market 
forces will tend to push after-tax returns into equality. Thus, in an 
environment with a worldwide tax system, because every investor 
pays tax at the same rate on all income regardless of source, competi-
tion tends to push before-tax rates of return across countries into 
equality. In such circumstances, welfare cannot be improved by 
changing the location of capital. Thus, a worldwide tax system satis-
fies CEN. 
29 See Harvey S. Rosen & Ted Gayer, Public Finance 341-42 (8th ed. 2008). 
30 See Musgrave, note 6, at 74-75. In effect, international convention assigns the pri-
mary right to tax to the source country and gives the residence country a secondary right. 
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That can be seen by returning to the example and adding more 
structure. Recall that in the example, the U.S. tax rate is 40% and the 
EU tax rate is 30%. Assume further that readily available invest-
ments in the United States yield a before-tax rate of return of 10% 
annually (the "benchmark asset"). That implies that U.S. investors 
earn 6% after tax on their domestic investments. Because capital is 
assumed to be freely mobile, the before-tax rate of return in the Euro-
pean Union also must be 10% annually. That can be seen as follows. 
A U.S. investor in the European Union earns 10% before tax and 
pays tax at 30% to the European Union. That leaves the U.S. investor 
with an after-tax return of 7%. With a worldwide tax system, the U.S. 
investor reports the entire 10% before-tax return to the U.S. govern-
ment and is assessed a tentative tax liability of 40% on that return. 
The U.S. investor receives a FTC for the 30% tax paid to the Euro-
pean Union. That leaves the investor with an additional10% tax obli-
gation on the before-tax income.31 Thus, the U.S. investor has no 
incentive to shift capital between the European Union and the United 
States because the after-tax rate of return in both jurisdictions is 6%. 
Assuming that the European Union provides an unlimited FfC, the 
analysis is similar except that the after-tax rate of return for investors 
from the European Union is 7%, not 6%. Note that if the before-tax 
rate of return in the European Union is not 10%, then the market 
would not be in equilibrium, capital would shift from the jurisdiction 
with a lower before-tax rate of return to the jurisdiction with a higher 
rate of return, until the before-tax rate of return was the same across · 
jurisdictions. Because a worldwide tax system leads to an equilibrium 
where the before-tax rate of return is equal everywhere, it follows that 
a worldwide tax system results in CEN.32 
Suppose that one or more countries diverge from the consensus and 
decline to tax their residents on foreign source income. Does the tax 
system still satisfy CEN? That depends upon what happens to the 
return to capital in different jurisdictions. If the countries that still use 
worldwide taxation are large enough that they continue to determine 
the before-tax rate of return everywhere and so set that rate equal 
around the world, then CEN is still satisfied. Alternatively, if those 
countries are no longer so large that the before-tax rate of return dif-
fers across countries, then CEN is lost. 
It follows that if all countries adopt territorial taxation, then the tax 
system will not achieve CEN. That is easy to illustrate with the exam-
31 For simplicity and ease of exposition all assets are assumed to be riskless. Risk is 
discussed briefly in note 68. 
32 It has long been recognized that in order for a worldwide tax system to achieve CEN 
without harmonizing tax rates the FTC must be unlimited. What other conditions must be 
met for a tax system to achieve CEN is a question that warrants further research. 
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pie. If the European Union and the United States both adopt territo-
rial taxation with tax rates of 30% and 40%, and if the before-tax rate 
of return in the United States is 10%, then the before-tax rate of re-
turn in the European Union will be 8.57%. At those rates, investors 
everywhere earn 6% after tax, and thus have no incentive to shift cap-
ital. Shifting capital from the European Union to the United States, 
however, will increase worldwide welfare. For example, taking $1 of 
capital from the European Union will cost $1.0857 in one year. In-
vesting that $1 in the United States will produced $1.10 in the United 
States in one year. The difference-$0.0143-is the surplus. The exis-
tence of a surplus means that CEN is not achieved. Thus, global 
adoption of a territorial tax system violates CEN. 
Over the years, Musgrave's conclusions that a worldwide tax system 
satisfies CEN and that a territorial tax system violates CEN have been 
broadly accepted by the economics, legal, and policy communities.33 
The story is more complicated with the other welfare benchmark, 
CIN. 
B. The Two Different Normative Meanings of GIN 
Musgrave discusses CIN in connection with business competition 
and expansion opportunities.34 As described by Musgrave, the idea 
embodied in CIN is that if all investors in a jurisdiction are taxed at 
the same rate, regardless of their residence, then taxation should not 
affect competition in that jurisdiction.35 Musgrave's notion of CIN 
might seem abstract and opaque, and that opacity has influenced the 
development of international tax policy. 
1. Savings Neutrality 
In an influential and important article published in 1980, Thomas 
Horst formalizes and models some of the basic ideas developed in 
Musgrave's early writings.36 In that short article, Horst demonstrates 
that a worldwide tax system will not distort the allocation of income 
across locationsY Horst then demonstrates that territorial taxation 
will not distort the consumption-savings decisions across jurisdic-
33 See, e.g., Graetz, note 2, at 271. 
34 Musgrave, note 6, at 119-21. 
35 ld. at 121. 
36 Thomas Horst, A Note on Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income, 94 
Q.J. Econ. 793 (1980). 
37 ld. at 796. 
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tions.38 Horst refers to the latter situation as one in which CIN 
obtains.39 
I refer to a tax system that does not distort the choice between con-
sumption and savings across individuals as achieving savings neutral-
ity. As is well recognized, income taxation distorts the consumption-
savings choice by increasing the price of saving relative to the price of 
current consumption. The price of current consumption is the loss of 
the after-tax return on that capital. For each taxpayer, that cost is the 
taxpayer's after-tax return. Accordingly, if taxpayers earn different 
after-tax rates of return, then a social planner can increase aggregate 
welfare (measured by willingness to pay) by shifting saving and con-
sumption across different investors. If, however, every investor earns 
the same after-tax return, then the social planner cannot improve wel-
fare by shifting savings. That interpretation of CIN caught on and 
took over in the economics literature.40 And so that interpretation is 
presumably what many economists have in mind when they say that a 
territorial tax system satisfies CIN. That is not what Musgrave meant, 
however, and more to the point, it is not what many modem day law-
yers and policy analysts have in mind when they talk about CIN. 
Nonetheless, global adoption of a territorial tax system satisfies 
such a conception of CIN. In a world where every country has a terri-
torial tax system, investors pay tax only in the source country. Thus, 
competition among investors for the highest after-tax rate of return 
will push after-tax rates of return across jurisdictions into equality. In 
terms of the example, if the before-tax rate of return in the United 
States is 10%, then the after-tax rate of return in the United States is 
6%. With a territorial tax system, 6% is the after-tax rate of return in 
the United States for both EU and U.S. investors. Competition to 
achieve the highest after-tax cash flow ensures that the after-tax rate 
of return in the European Union is also 6%, which implies a before-
tax rate of return of 8.57% in the European Union. Because the after-
tax rate of return is 6% everywhere for every investor, every investor 
faces the same trade-off between saving and current consumption. 
Thus, a central planner cannot increase aggregate welfare by reallo-
cating consumption and savings among individuals. Both U.S. and 
38 ld. 
39 ld. 
40 Devereux, in a footnote to his 1990 paper introducing the concept of capital owner-
ship neutrality (CON), writes, "[i]n my [Institute for Fiscal Studies] report with Mark Pear-
son, we attempted to redefine capital import neutrality to cover this concept [CONJ. This 
may have caused some confusion with what others have called capital import neutrality." 
Michael P. Devereux, Capital Export Neutrality, Capital Import Neutrality, Capital Own-
ership Neutrality and All That, 2 n.4 (Inst. for Fiscal Studies, Working Paper, 1990) (on file 
with author). As Devereux's comment makes clear, economists have a conception of CIN 
that differs from CON, although CON is a natural interpretation for the term CIN. 
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EU investors earn 6% after tax on their investments. Thus, at the 
margin, both U.S. and EU investors value $1 of current consumption 
as much as $1.06 in consumption one year later. Reduce investment 
by EU investors by $1. At the margin, the EU investor is indifferent 
between saving and consuming $1. The EU treasury, however, loses 
$0.0257 assuming the investment is made in the European Union. In-
crease investment by U.S. investors by $1. Assume that investment 
also takes place in the European Union. Thus, the EU treasury recov-
ers the $0.0257 it originally lost and so it is unaffected by the shift. If 
the U.S. investor receives $1.06 it is as well off with the investment as 
with current consumption. That leaves no surplus, which implies that 
the tax system satisfies CIN. Thus, a territorial tax system does not 
violate CIN when CIN is understood as savings neutrality. 
In contrast, a worldwide tax system does not satisfy CIN when CIN 
is understood to mean savings neutrality. That can be readily seen 
using the example. With a worldwide tax system, the before-tax rate 
of return is everywhere equal to 10%. U.S. investors earn 6% after 
tax on their investments, whereas EU investors earn 7%. Thus, at the 
margin, U.S. investors value $1 of current consumption as much as 
$1.06 in consumption one year later, whereas EU investors value $1 of 
current consumption as much as $1.07 in consumption one year later. 
That the tax system violates CIN can be seen by making the following 
adjustments. Reduce investment by EU investors by $1. That invest-
ment would have produced $1.10 in one year-$0.03 of which would 
have been paid to the EU tax authority. At the margin, EU investors 
are indifferent between saving $1 and consuming $1.07 in one year. 
Thus, they are indifferent to the change. The EU treasury, however, 
loses $0.03 assuming the investment is made in the European Union. 
Increase investment by U.S. investors by $1. Assume that investment 
also takes place in the European Union. Thus, the EU Treasury re-
covers the $0.03 it originally lost and so it is unaffected by the shift. If 
the U.S. investor receives $1.06, it as well off with the investment as 
with current consumption. Because the investment yields $1.10 before 
tax and the EU tax collector must receive $0.03 to break even, that 
leaves an additional $0.01. That $0.01 is surplus, and it implies that 
the tax system does not satisfy CIN. Thus, a worldwide tax system 
violates CIN when CIN is understood as savings neutrality. 
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2. Competitiveness or Ownership Neutrality 
The second meaning of CIN is as competitiveness or ownership 
neutrality.41 Ownership considerations were first introduced into the 
economic literature on foreign direct investment in the late 1950's.42 
That work, which is now recognized as the foundation of the modem 
literature on international trade, did not receive much attention at the 
time. Accordingly, for many years, economists ignored the impor-
tance of ownership in influencing foreign direct investment.43 
It was not until the 1980's that economists again started to think 
seriously about how ownership considerations impact foreign direct 
investment.44 Even so, the rigorous economic analysis of ownership 
remained outside the realm of international tax policy for years. 
That state of affairs changed slowly. In 1990, Michael Devereux 
coined the phrase capital ownership neutrality (CON) to describe a 
tax system that is neutral with respect to the ownership of assets.45 
Devereux's original paper on CON, however, was never published 
and the concept remained dormant for another decade. 
Then, in a series of articles published in 2003 and 2004, Mihir Desai 
and James Hines brought ownership into the forefront of the profes-
sional economists' literature on international taxation.46 Desai and 
Hines argue that productivity depends on the ownership of assets so 
that a tax regime that distorts ownership will impose large welfare 
costs.47 Their work has been highly influential, although some com-
41 For discussions of the links between ownership and competitiveness, see Michael 
Knoll, Taxes and Competitiveness (Univ. of Pa., Inst. for Law and Econ., Paper No. 06-28, 
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=953074 [hereinafter Competitiveness]; Michael 
Knoll, Business Taxes and International Competitiveness, in Dimensions of Competitive-
ness ch. 7 (Paul De Grauwe ed., 2010) [hereinafter Business Taxes]. 
42 Edward M. Graham & Paul R. Krugman, Foreign Direct Investment in the United 
States 191-93 (3rd ed. 1995). 
43 For an analysis that considers the importance of ownership and distinguishes owner-
ship and portfolio investment, see id. at 9-11. 
44 Graham and Krugman were one of the first to reconsider the importance of owner-
ship in influencing foreign direct investment in the first edition of their book published in 
1989. Id. 
45 Devereux, note 40. 
46 Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 Nat'! 
Tax J. 487 (2003) [hereinafter Evaluating Reform]; Mihir A. Desai, New Foundations for 
Taxing Multinational Corporations, Taxes, Mar. 2004, at 39; Mihir A. Desai & James R. 
Hines Jr., Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting, 57 Nat'! 
Tax J. 937 (2004). 
47 Devereux describes his concept of CON as broader than that of Desai & Hines. The 
latter refers to acquisitions of existing assets only, whereas the former applies to both ac-
quisitions and international trade. Michal P. Devereux, Taxation of Outbound Direct In-
vestment: Economic Principles and Tax Policy Considerations, 24 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol. 
698, 707 (2008). 
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mentators question the magnitude of tax-induced ownership distor-
tions and the data/measurements Desai and Hines employ.48 
Yet, the idea of competitiveness or ownership neutrality is much 
older. It seems clear upon reading Musgrave that when she used the 
term CIN she had competitiveness in mind, not savings neutrality. 
Thus, in her 1963 work, Musgrave introduces the phrase "capital im-
port neutrality" in the following sentence: "A form of capital-import 
neutrality under which all investors who invest in one particular coun-
try are subject to the same tax treatment, namely, that of the country 
of the source of investment income, would allow all foreign investors 
in that country equal opportunities for expansion."49 Although Mus-
grave rejects CIN as the appropriate welfare benchmark because it 
does not promote neutrality with respect to the location of invest-
ment,50 the passage is clearly not about savings, but instead has more 
to do with competitiveness.s1 
Similarly, in her 1969 work, Musgrave writes that business people 
argue that "the relevant concept of neutrality is equal treatment of 
U.S. investors abroad and their foreign competitors (capital-import 
neutrality)."52 And in a section entitled "Capital-import neutrality,"53 
Musgrave writes: "[B]usinessmen frequently maintain that neutrality 
should apply between U.S. foreign investors and their competitors 
abroad. This view of neutrality, which may be termed 'capital-import 
neutrality,' suggests taxation by source or exemption of foreign invest-
ment income by the United States."54 Once again, Musgrave is skepti-
cal of the efficiency and fairness benefits of CIN, but even so there is 
no ambiguity as to connotation. CIN is about competitiveness, not 
savings. 
It is certainly fair to say that Musgrave does not describe the nature 
of the competition that occurs between businesses. Nowhere does she 
48 Mitchell A. Kane, Ownership Neutrality, Ownership Distortions, and International 
Tax Welfare Benchmarks, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 53 (2006); Harry Grubert, Comment on Desai 
and Hines, "Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting," 58 
Nat'! Tax J. 263 (2005). 
49 Richman, note 6, at 8. 
50 Id. 
51 The connection between expansion and ownership is not clear. The idea might be 
that a lower tax rate means more after-tax dollars to invest and hence greater expansion. 
Alternatively, the idea might be that a lower tax rate means that the investor will earn 
more after tax on future investment, which will encourage greater expansion. The latter is 
closer to the idea of ownership. Such confusion has occurred in other areas. For a discus-
sion of that confusion in the context of tax-exempt and taxable investors, see Michael S. 
Knoll, The UBIT: Leveling an Uneven Playing Field or Tilting a Level One?, 76 Fordham 
L. Rev. 857 (2007) . 
52 Musgrave, note 6, at 118. 
53 ld. 
54 ld. at 119. 
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explain how businesses compete with one another to expand produc-
tion. Modem corporate finance, however, does explain how firms 
compete. They compete with one another for assets by raising money 
from outside investors, which they use to acquire assets. Thus, the 
competition between businesses takes the form of competition to own 
(and otherwise control) assets.55 
Ownership neutrality, then, is a second meaning of CIN and it 
seems to be the meaning intended by Musgrave. It is also a more 
natural meaning for the term CIN than the alternative meaning of not 
distorting the consumption-savings choice across investors. The 
phrase "capital import neutrality" does not suggest anything about 
savings. Instead, the phrase suggests investment from abroad into a 
host country in competition with local investors and the neutrality is 
often expressed as occurring between a home investor and a foreign 
investor or among foreign investors from different states. In many 
instances, the investors are assumed to be firms, not individuals, which 
further strains the interpretation of CIN as dealing with the individual 
investors' trade-off between consumption and savings. Also, both 
CEN and CIN are often described as dealing with foreign direct in-
vestment, not portfolio investment.56 In a world where firms make 
direct investments and individuals make portfolio investments, it 
makes little sense for CIN to be about both direct investment and the 
consumption-savings tradeoff. Instead, ownership neutrality-or 
something close to it-appears to be what many writers about tax pol-
icy who are not professionally trained economists have in mind when 
they use the term CIN. 57 
Although this is speculation, I suspect that many of the authors who 
use CIN as a form of ownership neutrality think of it as having imme-
diate welfare consequences. Differential tax rates translate into a 
competitive advantage, which in turn translates into an excess bur-
den.58 It is also easy to understand how many readers without formal 
economic training came to think that absolute differences in tax rates 
across taxpayers determines competitiveness or ownership. It was a 
short step from that conclusion to the conclusion that differences in 
ss The term "assets" refers to a wide range of projects in which a business might invest, 
including the acquisition of existing plant and equipment, investment in new projects, and 
even the competition to make sales. 
56 But see Devereux, note 47, at 705 (analyzing CEN, CIN, and CON in the context of 
both portfolio and direct investment). 
57 The language of the traditional proof of the impossibility of achieving both CEN and 
CIN simultaneously without harmonizing tax rates reinforces this interpretation. 
58 Such differences in tax rates immediately translate into competitive differences when 
the competition is between separately taxed entities (for example, corporations) as op-
posed to investors with capital to invest. See Knoll, Competitiveness, note 41; Knoll, Busi-
ness Taxes, note 41. 
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tax rates across investors have adverse welfare consequences by dis-
torting who makes certain investments. 
Furthermore, many of the writers who reproduce or refer to the 
proof of the impossibility of a tax system simultaneously satisfying 
both CEN and CIN seem to have in mind the notion of CIN as owner-
ship neutrality, not CIN as savings neutrality.59 I would guess that an 
even larger number of readers of those works think of CIN as closer 
to ownership neutrality than to savings neutrality when they read the 
proof and think about its significance. 
The use of CIN to refer to a ]eve! playing field between foreign and 
domestic investors is in wide use. And this idea is closely connected 
with the concept of ownership. As Hugh Ault and David Bradford 
wrote in 1990, "'[c]apital-import neutrality' refers to the nationality of 
ownership of firms."60 
It is certainly fair and accurate to describe much of the writing that 
advocates for CIN as ownership neutrality as thinly reasoned, espe-
cially the connection between CIN and economic efficiency. It is, 
however, incorrect to describe that work as treating CIN as savings 
neutrality or as anything other than as some aspect of 
competitiveness. 
The simplest explanation for the lack of rigor in discussions of the 
connection between CIN as ownership neutrality and economic effi-
ciency is that professional economists, until recently, generally 
thought the ownership of capital was unrelated to considerations of 
economic efficiency. In several places, Musgrave notes that the wel-
fare considerations of the residence and nationality of the investor are 
of secondary importance to considerations of the location of invest-
ment.61 And more recently, Ault and Bradford wrote "[t]he national-
ity of the owners of capita] is not generally associated with 
economically significant consequences (apart, perhaps, from portfolio 
diversification)."62 Thus, it is easy to see why some commentators, 
especially professional economists, might see Devereux, Desai, and 
Hines as introducing ownership considerations into the international 
tax policy discussion. However, the risk from reading Devereux, 
Desai, and Hines in that fashion is that it can cause the reader to mis-
understand and misinterpret a large literature on international taxa-
tion by writers who are not professional economists. 
59 See, e.g., Graetz, note 2. 
60 Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis of the 
U.S. System and its Economic Premises, in Taxation in the Global Economy 11, 39 (Assaf 
Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990). 
61 E.g. , Musgrave, note 6, at 9, 27. 
62 Ault & Bradford, note 60, at 39. 
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When viewed from the perspective of non economists working in the 
field of international tax policy, Devereux, Desai, and Hines do not so 
much introduce ownership considerations into the discussion of inter-
national tax policy as they provide a rigorous economic foundation for 
doing so. Moreover, Desai and Hines have also been outspoken advo-
cates for adopting an ownership neutral tax regime on the grounds 
that there can be large and negative welfare consequences from 
adopting tax systems that distort ownership patterns.63 Thus, Desai 
and Hines argue at length that the ownership of capital substantially 
affects the productivity of that capital and hence global welfare.64 
Desai and Hines also look at what sorts of tax systems will or will not 
distort the ownership of capital.65 They conclude that global adoption 
of either territorial or worldwide taxation will not distort ownership 
patterns even if tax rates vary across countries. 66 
In order to understand the circumstances under which ownership 
neutrality occurs, the example needs more structure. Recall that the 
before-tax rate of return for investments in the United States is 10% a 
year. Assume that there is an investment available (the "candidate 
investment") through which a $1000 investment will yield $1100 in 
one year when that investment is liquidated. If the candidate invest-
ment is undertaken by a U.S. investor in the United States, the U.S. 
investor will report $100 income, pay $40 tax, and be left with an after-
, tax cash flow of $1060. The candidate investment is, thus, worth $1000 
to a U.S. investor.67 That is because at that price the investment gen-
63 Desai & Hines, Evaluating International Tax Reform, note 46, at 494. 
64 Id. at 494-96. 
65 Id. Some of my recent scholarship contributes to this literature. E.g., Knoll, Business 
Taxes, note 41; Knoll, Competitiveness, note 41. 
66 Desai & Hines, Evaluating International Tax Reform, note 46, at 494-95. 
67 In order to calculate the value of the candidate investment to a potential investor, the 
following notation is helpful. Denote the pretax cash flow from the candidate investment 
by C, the before-tax return on alternative investments by R, the total tax rate imposed on 
an investor from Country ion alternative investments by t;, the total tax rate imposed on an 
investor from Country ion the candidate investment by t1, and the price paid by an investor 
from Country i for the candidate investment by V;. An investor from Country i will have 
C(1 . t) + V;t1 after paying taxes on the candidate investment. That same investor must 
receive at least V;(1 + R(1 - t;)) or will forgo the candidate investment for other invest-
ments. Equating those two expressions and rearranging terms, yields the maximum bid 
price for the candidate investment by an investor from Country i: V; = C(1 - t) /[1- t1 + R(l 
- t;)]. 
Furthermore, if the candidate investment is taxed the same as other investments, t; = t1, 
then the above equation for the maximum bid price an investor in Country i will pay for 
the candidate investment simplifies to V; = C/(1 + R). Substituting $1100 for C and 10% 
for R into that equation yields $1000. That an investor from the United States is willing to 
pay up to $1000 to acquire the candidate investment can be seen as follows. In one year, 
that investor will receive $1100, of which $100 is income. The U.S. investor pays $40 tax 
and so is left with $1060. Thus, the U.S. investor earns an after-tax return of 6%, which 
confirms that such investor is willing to pay up to $1000 for the candidate investment. 
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erates an after-tax return of 6%, the same rate as other readily availa-
ble investments.68 
Assume that the United States and the European Union both adopt 
worldwide tax systems. The before-tax rate of return in the European 
Union, then, would be 10% as well. On their alternative investments 
EU investors would earn 7% after tax, not the 6% after tax as do U.S. 
investors. The reason why EU investors earn more after tax than do 
U.S. investors is they are taxed at 30% instead of 40%. 
If an EU investor acquired the candidate investment in the United 
States, then that investor would report $100 of U.S. source income to 
the U.S. government, which would assess a tax liability of $40. That 
would allow the EU investor to repatriate $1060. The EU investor 
would also report $100 income to EU tax authorities and be assessed a 
tentative tax liability of $30.6::1 That investor would also receive a FTC 
of $40 for the $40 paid to the U.S. Treasury on that same income. 
Because the EU tax liability on that income is only $30, the EU inves-
tor would be entitled to a rebate from the EU treasury of $10. That 
would leave the EU investor with a net total tax liability of $30 and 
hence with a cash flow of $1070 after tax. The EU investor, thus, 
would value the candidate investment at $1000, the same as a U.S. 
investor.7° Because the EU and U.S. investor both value the candi-
date investment at $1000, CIN would be satisfied with respect to the 
U.S. market.71 
68 As described throughout this Article, the value that an investor places on an asset is a 
function of how high the investor is taxed on that asset relative to other assets. That raises 
the question: What other assets are relevant? In a world of riskless assets, all assets are 
perfect substitutes for one another. In a world of risky assets, however, portfolio selection 
is more complicated and so the question what assets are the right alternatives is a difficult 
one. Mihir Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala argue that the right way to think about that 
question is to use the after-tax capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Mihir Desai & Dham-
mika Dharmapala, Investor Taxation in Open Economies (Aug. 2009), http://areas.kenan-
flagler.unc .edu/Accounting/TaxCenter/taxsym2010/Documents/Dharmapala-Desai.pdf. 
According to that model, relative tax rates across assets and individuals determine the 
relative intensity of investments. Id. at 16-18. In such a world, investors do not specialize 
in their investments by holding only the most tax-advantaged investments and avoiding all 
other investments. Id. Instead, investors tend to hold a higher share of their portfolio in 
tax-advantaged investments and a smaller share in tax-disadvantaged investments, where 
tax-advantaged and tax-disadvantaged is measured by how the investor is taxed on that 
asset relative to other assets as compared with all other investors. ld. 
69 For simplicity and ease of exposition all amounts are expressed in U.S. dollars. 
70 The value of the candidate investment to an EU investor is calculated using the sim-
pler equation in note 67 for the value of the candidate investment when the tax rate on the 
candidate investment (ti) and the benchmark asset (t;) are the same. In that case, the tax 
rates drop out of the equation. 
71 The example in the text assumes that differences in tax rates across countries do not 
reflect differences in services (value) provided to capital investors. If some of those tax 
differences are reflected in services, then a worldwide tax system will not achieve owner-
ship neutrality. 
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Note that if the EU FfC were limited to the product of the EU tax 
rate and the EU investor's foreign income, then the investor would 
receive a credit of only $30. That would leave the EU investor with no 
additional tax liability to the EU Treasury. Because the investor paid 
$40 tax to the U.S. Treasury and repatriated $1060, the investor's total 
tax liability would be $40 and after-tax cash flow would be only $1060. 
The additional $10 tax paid to the U.S. Treasury would generate no 
usable FfC, which accounts for the $10 difference in taxes paid and 
after-tax cash flows in the two versions of the example. If the FfC 
were limited, then CIN would not be satisfied for the EU investor. 
The EU investor would value the candidate investment at only 
$985.07.72 The EU investor would value the candidate investment less 
than an equally efficient U.S. investor who had the same cash flow 
and paid the same tax. That is because the EU investor would pay 
more tax and have a smaller after-tax cash flow if the investment was 
made in the United States than if the economically equivalent invest-
ment was made in the European Union. In this circumstance, CIN is 
said not to be satisfied in the U.S. market. 
- Assume the candidate investment was sourced in the European 
Union. That investment would produce $1100 when it was liquidated 
in one year. An EU investor who made the investment would report 
$100 income to the EU tax authorities, pay $30 tax, and would be left 
with an after-tax cash flow of $1070. The EU investor, thus, would 
value the candidate investment at $1000.73 A U.S. investor who made 
the investment would report $100 income to the European Union and 
pay $30 tax to the EU tax authorities. That investor would also report 
$100 to U.S. tax authorities, and would be assessed a tentative tax 
liability of $40. The U.S. investor would also receive a FTC of $30, 
and thus would owe an additional $10 tax to the U.S. Treasury. In 
total, a U.S. investor would pay $40 in tax, which would reflect the 
U.S. tax rate. After paying all taxes, the U.S. investor would be left 
with $1060, which represents a 6% after-tax rate of return on the in-
vestment. Thus, the candidate investment would be worth $1000 to 
the U.S. investor if it was located in the European Union, the same 
value as it has to EU investors.74 Thus, the worldwide tax system also 
satisfies CIN with respect to the European Union. 
72 The value of the candidate investment to an EU investor is calculated using the gen-
eral equation in note 67 for the value of the candidate investment and setting t; equal to 
40% and ti equal to 30%. 
73 Again, the value of the candidate investment to an EU investor is calculated using the 
simpler equation in note 67, which is not a function of tax rates. 
74 Once again, when the tax rate on the candidate investment and on benchmark invest-
ments are the same, the value of the candidate investment is not a function of tax rates. 
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Consider now the possibility that the United States and the Euro-
pean Union both adopted territorial tax systems. Assuming that the 
before-tax rate of return in the United States remained at 10%, U.S. 
investors would still earn 6% after tax in the United States. EU inves-
tors, however, would also earn 6% after tax in the United States. 
Equilibrium, thus, requires that EU investors also earn 6% after tax in 
the European Union. Given the 30% tax rate in the European Union, 
a 6% after-tax rate of return implies a before-tax rate of return of 
8.57% in the European Union. 
Assume that the candidate investment was located in the United 
States where it generates a before-tax rate of return of 10%. Whether 
it was acquired by an EU or U.S. investor, the holder would receive 
$1100, pay $40 in taxes, and be left with $1060. Such an investment 
would be worth $1000 because it generated an after-tax rate of return 
of 6%, the same as the benchmark asset despite the presence of differ-
ent rates. 
Assume that the candidate investment was located in the European 
Union. If we assume that competition takes the form of reducing the 
cash flow from the candidate investment, not increasing its cost, then 
the cash flow from the candidate investment would fall to $1085.71.75 
At a 30% tax rate, the EU would collect $25.71 tax, which would leave 
the investor with an after-tax cash flow of $1060. That represents an 
after-tax rate of return of 6%. With such a return, the candidate in-
vestment would be worth $1000 to both EU and U.S. investors. Thus, 
CIN would be satisfied in the European Union as well. 
As the above examples show, CIN can be satisfied with either a 
territorial or worldwide tax system. That is in contrast with the usual 
view that a territorial tax system will achieve CIN, but a worldwide tax 
system will not.76 Looked at from the perspective of an investment in 
the United States, CIN is the idea that EU-based investors investing 
in the United States should enjoy neither a tax advantage nor a tax 
disadvantage relative to their U.S.-based competitors. The standard 
explanation of CIN assumes whether there is a tax advantage depends 
on the relative tax rates applicable to U.S.- and EU-based investors 
investing in the United States. That, however, is incorrect when CIN 
is interpreted as ownership neutrality. As the example plainly shows, 
such neutrality does not depend on the relative tax rates paid by U.S. 
and EU investors in the same jurisdiction. Instead, each party's com-
75 It might be more intuitive to assume that competition would increase the price rather 
than reduce the cash flow from the investment. Economically, the two effects are 
equivalent in that they reduce the before-tax rate of return. Assuming that the cash flow 
declines, however, makes clear what the effect is on the rate of return. 
76 The literature recognizes that both territorial and worldwide taxation can achieve 
CON. See Shaheen, note 5, at 209. 
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petitive position in the United States depends on the tax rate it pays in 
the United States relative to the rate it pays in the European Union.77 
Returning to the example, if U.S. investors pay 40% tax everywhere 
they invest and if EU investors pay 30% tax everywhere they invest, 
then both groups of investors will be indifferent as to the location of 
their investments as long as the before-tax return is equal across re-
gions. It is true that EU-based investors earn more after-tax when 
they invest in the United States than do U.S. investors. In order for 
the EU-based investors to undertake the project, however, they must 
meet a higher after-tax hurdle rate because EU-based investors earn a 
higher after-tax rate of return at home as well. These two effects off-
set one another. In other words, the competitive positions of investors 
in any market does not depend upon their relative tax rates in that 
market, but rather on differences in their tax rates in that market com-
pared with their tax rates in other markets.78 The latter is less intui-
tive than the former and so it has confused many readers. 
What this means is that CIN has been misapplied. CIN does not 
require that U.S.- and EU-based investors pay tax at the same rate in 
any single jurisdiction. Instead, it requires that investors from a given 
jurisdiction earn the same after-tax return in different jurisdictions. 
As demonstrated further below, that requirement does not violate 
CEN, which requires that for each investor the before-tax rate of re-
turn is equal everywhere. Before discussing the possibility of a tax 
system satisfying both CEN and CIN simultaneously without harmo-
nizing tax rates on capital, the next Section summarizes the above dis-
cussion of the different types of distortions that are important for 
understanding international tax policy. 
77 It follows that a country's investors can enjoy a tax-induced competitive advantage in 
a region even if they are taxed more heavily than their competitors. They will have an 
advantage as long as they are taxed less heavily in the region than they are taxed in other 
regions relative to their competitors. For example, if U.S. firms pay tax at 40% on their 
U.S. investments and 35% on their EU investments, they will enjoy a competitive advan-
tage in the European Union over EU investors who pay tax at 30% everywhere. To make 
the example more concrete, assume that the before-tax return to capital everywhere is 
10%. EU-based investors will earn 7% in both the European Union and the United 
States; U.S.-based investors will earn 6% in the United States and 6.5% in the European 
Union. Assuming the marginal investment for U.S.-based investors was in the United 
States, they would be willing to make investments in the European Union that had a 
before-tax return of 9.25% because their after-tax return of 6.01% exceeds their 6% hurdle 
rate. 
78 In other words, competitive position depends upon second differences, not first 
differences. 
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C. The Three Types of Distortions 
The discussion above describes three, not two, types of investment 
distortions implied by CEN and CIN. Those distortions include the 
location where capital is invested, the ownership of capital, and the 
savings-consumption decision. The first distortion-where capital is 
located-is the only distortion associated with CEN. In addition, the 
standard for neutrality-that the before-tax rate of return is equal 
everywhere-closely matches up with the widely perceived view that 
each investor pays tax at the same rate on income earned at home and 
abroad. The confusion comes from CIN. 
CIN has two meanings. One of those meanings comes from the ec-
onomics literature. According to that definition, CIN occurs when 
there is no distortion across individuals in the savings-consumption 
decision.79 That, in turn, implies that every investor earns the same 
after-tax return at the margin. Because for marginal investments, all 
investors will earn the same before-tax rate of return in any location, 
the savings neutrality interpretation of CIN requires all investors in a 
jurisdiction to pay tax at the same tax rate. That is to say, savings 
neutrality does not require that the tax rate be the same in every juris-
diction. It does, however, imply that everyone who earns income in a 
jurisdiction pay tax at the same tax rate. Thus, such an interpretation 
of CIN is consistent with territorial taxation, but not with worldwide 
taxation. 
Under the second definition of CIN, a tax system satisfies CIN if 
investors from all jurisdictions compete on par for investments in each 
jurisdiction. This is the definition of CIN implied in Musgrave's writ-
ings.80 It is also the definition many policymakers and lawyers have in 
mind when they talk about CIN. Moreover, many people think that 
such neutrality requires that investors from different jurisdictions pay 
tax at the same rate in each jurisdiction. As described above, equality 
of tax rates across investors in each jurisdiction is a sufficient, but is 
not a necessary condition for ownership neutrality. The standard for 
ownership neutrality is not equality in absolute tax rates, but rather 
equality in relative tax rates. If relative tax rates paid by different 
investors across jurisdictions are equal, then ownership neutrality is 
achieved. There is no difference in relative tax rates across jurisdic-
tions if taxpayers pay the same tax rate in all jurisdictions even if dif-
ferent taxpayers pay taxes at different rates. That is to say, savings 
neutrality requires that for each investor, the after-tax return is equal 
everywhere. It is not necessary that investors from different countries 
earn the same after-tax return or pay tax at the same rate as one an-
79 See notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
BO See notes 41-57 and accompanying text. 
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other. Accordingly, ownership neutrality can be satisfied using either 
territorial or worldwide taxation (without harmonizing tax rates) as 
long as all jurisdictions use the same type of tax system. 
Summarizing these results, Table 1 describes the three types of dis-
tortions, the capital neutrality proposition associated with each distor-
tion, the neutrality standard for each distortion expressed in terms of 
rates of return and tax rates, and whether territorial, worldwide, or 
both types of tax systems (if universally adopted) would meet that 
standard. 
TABLE 1 
TAX NEUTRALITY CoNDITIONS 
Distortion Neutrality Standard for Standard for Systems 
Proposition Neutrality (rate Neutrality (taxes) that 
of return) Satisfy 
Location CEN For each investor, The tax rate is Universal 
the before-tax equal everywhere. Worldwide 
rate of return is 
equal everywhere. 
Savings CIN All investors earn Every investor faces Universal 
(economists' the same after-tax the same tax rate at Territorial 
interpretation) rate of return at the margin. 
the margin. 
Ownership CIN For each investor, Relative tax rates Either 
(traditional the after-tax rate across jurisdictions Universal 
interpretation) of return is equal are the same Worldwide 
CON everywhere. across investors or 
Universal 
Territorial 
D. A Note on Terminology 
In light of the confusion that has been caused by CEN and CIN, 
especially the two different meanings of CIN, I believe we need to be 
more careful about terminology. We can do that in at least three dif-
ferent ways. The first possibility would be for commentators to drop 
the terms CEN and CIN. If the literature were to take this route, we 
would not stop using the concepts or the analyses that have been de-
veloped over the years, but we would avoid the labels. In their place, 
we could write and speak directly and specifically about the relevant 
distortion. Thus, instead of talking about CEN, commentators could 
talk about distortions in the location of investments (locational distor-
tions). And instead of talking about CIN, commentators could talk 
about ownership and saving distortions. The last is the key-com-
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mentators need to be clear whether they mean a distortion in owner-
ship or a distortion in saving. 
Second, if it is too late to banish talk of CEN, CIN, and CON, then 
every speaker or writer who uses the term CIN should try to be clear 
whether she is talking about distortions in ownership or in the savings-
consumption choice. A simple change in terminology can help to fa-
cilitate such understanding. Instead of simply using the term CIN, we 
can strive to be more precise. Thus, we can speak of CIN as savings 
neutrality orCIN as ownership neutrality.81 It might take a while for 
such terminology to catch on, but once it did everyone would under-
stand what the speaker or writer had in mind or would ask the speaker 
if the sense is not specified. 
A third possibility is to associate locational neutrality with CEN, 
savings neutrality with CIN, and ownership neutrality with CON. This 
would match up well with most trained economists' understanding of 
these concepts. It also would allow the discussion of CON to proceed 
with little interruption or change in vocabulary. My concern, how-
ever, is that such a solution would not dispel the confusion of many 
lawyers and policymakers. The plainest meaning and most obvious 
connotation of CIN is too closely connected with ownership neutrality 
to be confident that such a simple change in vocabulary would remedy 
the confusion where it is most prevalent.82 
v. WHAT TAX SYSTEM SIMULTANEOUSLY SATISFIES CEN AND CIN? 
This Part is divided into five Sections. In the first Section, I show 
that a worldwide tax system can simultaneously satisfy both CEN and 
CIN as ownership neutrality without harmonizing tax rates, whereas a 
territorial tax system cannot. In the second Section, I show that a ter-
ritorial tax system can simultaneously satisfy both conceptions of CIN 
without harmonizing tax rates, whereas a worldwide tax system can-
not. In the third Section, I argue that the traditional proof of the im-
possibility of simultaneously achieving CEN and CIN still holds if CIN 
is understood as savings neutrality. In that Section, I also describe 
why a tax system cannot simultaneously satisfy both CEN and CIN as 
savings neutrality without harmonizing tax rates. In the fourth Sec-
tion, I describe and comment upon Shaheen's argument that a territo-
rial tax system can simultaneously satisfy both CEN and CIN as 
ownership neutrality without harmonizing tax rates, whereas a world-
81 For those who like capitalized acronyms, CIN as savings neutrality could be written as 
CIN/SN and CIN as ownership neutrality as CIN/ON. I leave it to others to determine 
how these acronyms are pronounced. 
82 Using CON for ownership neutrality and referring to CIN as "CIN as savings neutral-
ity" for a period of time is likely to dispel some of the existing confusion. 
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wide tax system cannot satisfy either condition.83 The fifth Section 
summarizes the above results. 
A. The Argument that a Worldwide Tax System Simultaneously 
Satisfies CEN and GIN 
In this Section, I show that a worldwide tax system can simultane-
ously satisfy both CEN and CIN as ownership neutrality without har-
monizing tax rates, whereas a territorial tax system cannot. That 
result can be shown in an intuitive manner by returning to the numeri-
cal example.84 When every country uses a worldwide tax system with 
an unlimited FfC, the before-tax rate of return would be equal every-
where. In terms of the example, then, the before-tax rate of return 
would be 10% in every jurisdiction. That implies that CEN would be 
satisfied. 
Under those circumstances, CIN in the sense of ownership neutral-
ity also would be satisfied. The candidate investment would be worth 
$1000 to both EU and U.S. investors whether it was offered in the 
European Union or the United States. At a price of $1000, the candi-
date investment would yield $1100 in one year. That is a before-tax 
rate of return of 10%, which is the same as the benchmark asset.85 
Thus, CIN as ownership neutrality would be satisfied. 
- Conversely, with a territorial tax system, CEN and CIN as owner-
ship neutrality are not satisfied simultaneously with different tax rates 
across countries. Returning to the example, where the U.S. tax rate is 
40% and the EU tax rate is 30%, and the after-tax rate of return is 6% 
everywhere, the before-tax rate of return in the United States would 
be 10%, but it would be only 8.57% in the European Union. It imme-
diately follows from the difference in before-tax rates of return that 
CEN would not be satisfied because global welfare could be increased 
by shifting assets from the European Union to the United States. CIN 
as ownership neutrality, however, would still be satisfied. First, if the 
candidate investment was in the United States, it would generate 
$1100 in one year and so it would be worth $1000 to both EU and U.S. 
investors. Second, if the candidate investment was in the European 
Union, it would generate $1087.51 in one year and so it would be 
worth $1000 to both EU and U.S. investors. 
83 See Shaheen, note 5. 
84 See discussion accompanying notes 13-21. That conclusion also follows directly from 
Table 1 and the discussion above. 
85 Of course, EU and U.S. investors earn different after-tax rates of return. 
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B. The Argument that a Territorial Tax System Simultaneously 
Satisfies Both Interpretations of CIN 
Although a territorial tax system will not satisfy CEN, it will satisfy 
CIN as savings neutrality. Thus, a territorial tax system will satisfy 
both meanings of CIN. That a territorial tax system satisfies CIN as 
savings neutrality is easy to see. With a territorial tax system, the af-
ter-tax rate of return is equal everywhere and is the same for all inves-
tors. Thus, in terms of the example, the after-tax rate of return is 6% 
for both EU and U .S. investors. Because the after-tax rate of return is 
the same for both EU and U.S. investors, shifting saving and con-
sumption among investors will not increase welfare. Thus, a territorial 
tax system satisfies both meanings of CIN. 
In contrast, a worldwide tax system does not satisfy CIN as savings 
neutrality because the after-tax rate of return differs for residents of 
different jurisdictions. Thus, in the numerical example, EU investors 
earn 7% after tax, whereas U.S. investors earn 6% after tax. It there-
fore follows that a worldwide tax system simultaneously satisfies both 
CEN and CIN as ownership neutrality, but it fails to satisfy CIN as 
savings neutrality. And a territorial tax system simultaneously satis-
fies both CIN as savings neutrality and CIN as ownership neutrality, 
but it fails to satisfy CEN. 
C. Why No Tax System Can Achieve Both Locational and Savings 
Neutrality Without Harmonizing Tax Rates 
In Section V.A, I showed that a worldwide tax system can simulta-
neously satisfy both CEN and CIN as ownership neutrality. In Sec-
tion V.B, I showed that a territorial tax system can simultaneously 
satisfy both CIN as savings neutrality and CIN as ownership neutral-
ity. Nowhere, however, have I claimed that a tax system can satisfy 
both CEN and CIN as savings neutrality without harmonizing tax 
rates. Indeed, when CIN is interpreted as savings neutrality, the long-
standing claim that it is impossible for a tax system to satisfy simulta-
neously both CEN and CIN simultaneously without harmonizing tax 
rates is valid.s6 
The reason no tax system can achieve both locational and savings 
neutrality without harmonizing tax rates is straightforward. Loca-
tional neutrality requires that the before-tax rate of return is equal 
everywhere. Savings neutrality requires that all investors earn the 
same after-tax rate of return. Because each investor's after-tax rate of 
return is the product of the market-determined before-tax rate of re-
86 That result can also be seen in Table 1. However, the intuition behind the result is not 
clear from just looking at the table. 
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turn and one minus the investor's tax rate, it follows that savings neu-
trality and locational neutrality can be achieved simultaneously only if 
every investor pays tax at the same rate. Thus, it should not come as a 
surprise that global harmonization of tax rates is required to achieve 
both CEN (locational neutrality) and CIN (savings neutrality). 
D. Response to Shaheen's Argument that a Territorial Tax System 
Simultaneously Satisfies CEN and CIN 
I am not the first to argue that a single tax system can simultane-
ously satisfy both CEN and some conception of CIN without harmo-
mzmg tax rates. Shaheen argues that territorial taxation can 
simultaneously satisfy CEN and CIN as ownership neutrality, but 
worldwide taxation cannot simultaneously satisfy either neutrality 
benchmark.87 That claim conflicts with the result described above in 
two ways. First, Shaheen claims that worldwide taxation fails to 
achieve CEN.88 Second, Shaheen claims that territorial taxation can 
achieve CEN.89 In this Section, I offer my response to Shaheen's 
claims that a worldwide tax system cannot achieve CEN, but a territo-
rial tax system can. 
Shaheen, I believe, reached the wrong result with respect to world-
wide taxation because he used the wrong baseline for an efficient tax 
system. In arguing that a worldwide tax system cannot satisfy CEN, 
Shaheen used the baseline of the nontax world.90 Thus, Shaheen con-
cluded that a worldwide tax system cannot satisfy CEN because the 
tax will reduce savings and hence must also affect where property is 
'located.91 It does not follow, however, from the conclusion that a tax 
reduces savings and hence capital that there is also a locational distor-
tion. What it means for there to be locational neutrality is that the 
marginal productivity of capital is equal across jurisdictions. In such 
circumstances, there is not a locational distortion because it is not pos-
sible to increase welfare by reallocating capital across jurisdictions. 
Thus, as described above, worldwide taxation is locationally neutral 
because the before-tax return to capital is equal everywhere.92 
Shaheen also argues that territorial taxation simultaneously satisfies 
both CEN and CIN because the location of capital will be the same as 
in the nontax world.93 To reach that conclusion (especially the conclu-
t>;T Shaheen, note 5. 
88 Id. at 224-25. 
89 ld. 
90 Id. at 222. 
91 ld at 222-23. 
92 See discussion at Section V.A. 
93 Shaheen, note 5, at 226-27, 234, and 239. 
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sion that a territorial tax system satisfies CEN), Shaheen explicitly as-
sumes that the economic incidence of any tax imposed on capital falls 
fully on labor.94 That assumption is not standard in the literature. It 
is also inconsistent with most empirical research.95 Moreover, if true, 
it implies that both territorial and worldwide taxation would satisfy 
CEN. If a tax statutorily imposed on capital does not fall on capital, 
then differential tax rates on capital will not affect the allocation of 
capital across jurisdictions. That assumption, which is equivalent to 
assuming a completely inelastic supply of labor, is highly 
questionable.96 
E. Summary 
The two principal international tax systems can each achieve two of 
the three neutrality goals without harmonizing tax rates. This is set 
forth below in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
TAX NEUTRALITY WITH DIFFERENT TAX SYSTEMS 
Tax System Location Neutrality Ownership Neutrality Savings Neutrality 
Worldwide ,J " Territorial " " 
As is clear from Table 2, global adoption of a worldwide tax system 
can simultaneously satisfy both locational and ownership neutrality. 
And global adoption of a territorial tax system can simultaneously sat-
isfy both ownership and savings neutrality. It is, however, impossible 
for a tax system to satisfy both locational and savings neutrality with-
out harmonizing tax rates. 
94 Id. at 230-31. 
95 See Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know 
8-9 (NBER, Working Paper No. 11686, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=823189; 
William M. Gentry, Dep't of the Treasury, A Review of the Evidence on the Incidence of 
the Corporate Income Tax (OTA Paper 101, 2007); Jane G. Gravelle & Thomas L. Hunger-
ford, Corporate Tax Reform: Should We Really Believe the Research?, 121 Tax Notes 419 
(Oct. 27, 2008); Jane G. Gravelle & Kent Smetters, Who Bears the Burden of the Corpo-
rate Tax in the Open Economy? (NBER, Working Paper No. 8280, 2001), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=268889. 
% In light of the substantial uncertainty and disagreement on who bears the burden of 
the corporate income tax, there is simply no consensus that the burden falls entirely on 
labor. For a list of recent articles reviewing what is known about the economic incidence of 
the corporate tax, see sources cited in note 95. 
126 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64: 
VI. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The approach developed in this Article can also help to focus aca-
demic research. Various doctrines, concepts, and tax systems can be 
analyzed in terms of whether they advance or hinder attainment of 
one or more neutrality principles. For example, in this Article, I ex-
amine whether territorial and worldwide taxation achieves locational 
neutrality, savings neutrality, and ownership neutrality. I conclude 
that global adoption of worldwide taxation can achieve locational neu-
trality and ownership neutrality, but not savings neutrality, whereas 
global adoption of territorial taxation achieves savings neutrality and 
ownership neutrality, but not locational neutrality. 
These same neutrality concepts can also be used to analyze other 
tax laws. For example, in a recent article, I assess whether the corpo-
rate income tax can simultaneously satisfy both locational neutrality 
and ownership neutrality.97 I conclude that absent harmonization of 
corporate tax rates, it is impossible for a corporate income tax to 
achieve simultaneously both locational and ownership neutrality.98 
Similar analyses can be done for other tax systems. 
The approach employed in this Article can also be used to assess 
whether other tax rules-for example, the source, currency exchange, 
timing, and anti-discrimination rules-tend to promote or interfere 
- with various neutrality goals. That same approach can also be helpful 
in interpreting or designing tax rules in a way that promotes neutral-
ity. It also helps to illustrate the trade-offs from alternative rules or 
.systems of rules. 
The approach developed in the Article can also be used to examine 
investments in specific industries or asset classes by specific categories 
of investors. The international tax literature usually talks about CEN, 
CIN and CON in a manner that suggests that the 'C' which refers to 
capital denotes capital in aggregate or at least foreign direct invest-
ment in aggregate. The various capital neutrality concepts are rarely 
used to talk about investments in specific industries or from specific 
categories of investors. Although· savings neutrality probably makes 
sense only when talking about aggregate investment, locational neu-
trality and ownership neutrality are useful concepts for analyzing in-
vestments in specific industries and by specific investors. Thus, it is 
reasonable to ask whether tax rules encourage sovereign wealth funds 
(SWFs) or private foreign investors, relative to one another, to ac-
97 MichaelS. Knoll, The Corporate Income Tax and the Competitiveness of U.S. Indus-
tries, 63 Tax L. Rev. 771-96 (2010). 
98 Id. 
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quire U.S. equities.99 It is also worth asking whether tax laws en-
courage foreign investors to invest in U.S. real estate relative to U.S. 
investors.100 And it is important to ask whether current tax laws dis-
tort investment by nonprofits.101 It is also reasonable to inquire as to 
whether tax considerations encourage or discourage investment in 
auto production within the United States relative to production over-
seas. The language of locational neutrality and ownership neutrality 
facilitate that discussion by integrating that discussion into the larger 
international tax neutrality literature. 
The subtlety of that discussion, however, varies depending on the 
neutrality concept that is being assessed. As described above, loca-
tional neutrality requires that the before-tax rate of return on invest-
ments be equal across borders. That, in turn, requires that investors 
pay tax at the same total rate across jurisdictions. When the total tax 
rate on investments made in different jurisdictions is not equal, then 
there is not locational neutrality. The location of investment will be 
distorted by being shifted away from high-tax jurisdictions and to-
wards low-tax jurisdictions. Although there are some subtleties and 
some unexpected results occur because of implicit taxes and surrogate 
taxes, the results are largely intuitive and mostly as expected. 
In contrast, ownership neutrality is more complex and so the results 
are often not intuitive and so are frequently unexpected. There are 
not one, but two different standards for ownership neutrality, depend-
ing upon whether the competition is occurring among investors or en-
tities.102 And when the competition is between investors, the 
99 See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
440 (2009) (arguing that taxes provide SWFs with an advantage over other foreign inves-
tors); Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Taxing the Bandit Kings, 118 Yale L.J. 
Pocket Part 98 (2008), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/content/viewn20/14/ (arguing 
that SWFs and other foreign investors are roughly on par under current tax law); Michael 
S. Knoll, Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Do Taxes En-
courage Sovereign Wealth Funds to Invest in the United States?, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 703 
{2009) (arguing that whether SWFs are advantaged or disadvantaged relative to other pri-
vate foreign investors depends on a range of factors that vary across countries and describ-
ing how to design an international tax system for SWFs and private foreign investors that is 
ownership neutral). 
100 See Richard Kaplan, Creeping Xenophobia and the Taxation of Foreign-Owned Real 
Estate, 71 Geo. L.J. 1091 (1983). 
101 See, e.g., Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business In-
come Tax, 75 Va. L. Rev. 605 (1989); Knoll, note 51; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Com-
petition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1017 (1982). 
102 Throughout this Article, and in keeping with the standard practice in the literature, I 
ignore entities or assume that entities are explicitly or effectively taxed as pass-through 
entities. (An entity is effectively a pass-through, even if it is not technically one, if the 
beneficial owner is taxed on the basis of the entity's before-tax income and receives a FTC 
for any tax paid by that entity.) Much of the efficiency concerns with ownership probably 
arise at the level of the firm. Kane, note 48, at 58. Moreover, many multinational enter-
prises are taxed as corporations and those corporations are owned by investors who do not 
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distortion is not always in favor of the lowest-taxed investor. Instead, 
the advantage belongs to the investor who has the lowest total tax rate 
on the investment under consideration (the "candidate investment") 
relative to that same investor's total tax rate on readily available alter-
native investments (the "benchmark asset"). As a result, the tax con-
sequences can be complicated to work out and are not always 
intuitive.103 
VII. CoNCLUSION 
For decades, the debate over the form that the international tax sys-
tem should take has been dominated by the welfare benchmarks of 
CEN and CIN. That debate, however, has been confused because not 
all participants and readers share the same understanding of CIN. In 
the literature, there are two very different interpretations of CIN. In 
the interpretation favored by professional economists, CIN is savings 
neutrality. However, in the interpretation favored by lawyers, policy 
analysts, and lay readers CIN is most closely connected with competi-
tiveness or ownership neutrality. 
One place where that confusion is manifest is in the often-repeated 
statement that a tax system cannot simultaneously satisfy both CEN 
and CIN without harmonizing tax rates. That statement is correct 
when (and only when) CIN is understood as savings neutrality. It is, 
however, incorrect when CIN is understood as ownership neutrality. 
As described above, a worldwide tax system, which does not satisfy 
CIN as savings neutrality, simultaneously satisfies both CEN and CIN 
, as ownership neutrality. It is, therefore, possible for one tax system to 
achieve simultaneously both CEN and CIN as ownership neutrality. 
That, however, requires international coordination. Countries must 
either harmonize their tax rates (as has long been recognized) or they 
must all adopt worldwide taxation (in contrast with the accepted 
wisdom).104 
Finally, it is my hope that this Article will serve to focus more 
clearly the longstanding debate on the advantages and disadvantages 
of alternative international tax regimes and the search for an optimal 
receive FfCs for taxes paid by the corporation. In that case, ownership neutrality at both 
the level of the firm and the investor requires territorial taxation of the firm and worldwide 
taxation of the investor. See Knoll, Business Taxes, note 41. 
103 A good illustration of the complexity of the analysis, the difficulty in assessing who is 
advantaged and disadvantaged, the nonintuitive nature of many of the results, and the 
surprising nature of ownership neutral policy prescriptions is the recent series of papers 
assessing whether tax rules encourage or discourage investment by SWFs in the United 
States. See note 99. 
!04 In addition, in order for global adoption of a worldwide taxation to lead to CIN as 
ownership neutrality there cannot be separate entity-level taxation. 
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international tax regime. Although the international tax literature is 
voluminous and the advances in understanding achieved in recent 
years are numerous and important, much of the current conversation 
remains confused because of the ambiguity surrounding the notion of 
CIN. A clearer understanding of the distortions that various tax re-
gimes can cause and their relationship to the well-worn concepts of 
CEN and CIN-and careful use of terminology-should help every-
one interested in international taxation. And that should benefit all of 
us. 
